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Use of Tear Gas.
5. Referring to the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in favour of authority being given for the use of gas in China, subject to definite instructions as to the circumstances in which it is to be employed (C.I.D. Paper No. 761-B, paragraph 10), the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said he was advised that, from a legal point of view, the use of Tear Gas as a weapon of war was contrary to Treaty engagements. Technically it might be argued that its use against an armed mob did not constitute an infringement of Treaties, and that the Government of Canton was not a signatory of the Treaties. Were we to use Tear Gas we should not escape criticism, and the fact of our doing so would be used as propaganda against us.
The Secretary of State for War stated that, in any event, we should be compelled to send out a gas unit, as the Cantonese forces might use it against us.
It was agreed-
That the Secretary of State for War should have authority to purchase gas and to send it with the gas unit to China, but that no decision should be taken at present as to its actual employment.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1,
January 19, 1927.
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APPENDIX I.
(No. 13.) R.
Telegram to Sir J. Tilley (Tokyo).
Foreign Office, January 19, 1927, 7·15 P.M. JAPANESE Military Attaché states that in the opinion of the Japanese Chief of the General Staff, Japan would deal with the situation at Shanghai, in case of emergency, by means of naval landing parties. As regards troops, Japanese General Staff opinion at present is that the time has not come even to study the question of sending troops to Shanghai, and that therefore the Japanese General Staff wish to exchange intelligence information only.
Please seek urgent interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs and explain that difference in geographical position renders this policy impossible for us, especially if we have no knowledge of Japanese intentions in case Nationalist army moves against Shanghai. Japanese can reinforce at any moment at short notice. Distance makes arrival of our reinforcements much slower. It is therefore essential for us to know what real intentions of Japanese Government are. We desire, if possible, to act in co-operation and to conform our movements to a common plan, but if Japanese Government leave us in doubt as to their intentions or do not propose to defend Shanghai in any event we must give orders for further troop movements at once. We have, for this reason, been obliged already to warn an Indian Brigade for service in China.
You will make it clear to Minister that it is the uncertainty as to conditions and extent of Japanese co-operation that obliges us to hurry on our own preparations. It is important that I should receive your reply within forty-eight hours.
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